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ABSTRACT 
Simulation of threat aircraft tactics and capabilities during training is an integral 
component of maintaining the combat readiness of the United States Navy.  A dedicated 
adversary air force supports the majority of adversary training missions, but these 
airframes are aging and lack the sortie generation capacity and the performance 
capabilities to completely satisfy the training requirements.  The Navy currently uses 
other opposition forces to fill the gap between the adversary air force capacity and the 
demand for training. This training gap will grow over the next decade as current 
airframes reach their flight hour limits, and as resources become scarcer, the task of 
determining efficient assignment of these resources becomes more difficult for planners 
and the resulting solutions are more expensive than necessary.  This thesis presents the 
Adversary Sortie Optimization Tool, which uses an integer-linear program to optimize 
the assignment of adversary air sorties to meet the annual fleet training demands over a 
20-year planning horizon, and prescribes yearly upgrades to the adversary air force, 
including procurement of performance enhancing aircraft pods, improved radar, new 
aircraft, and system upgrades.  Solutions provide a reduction in operating costs of 
hundreds of millions of dollars using efficient sortie assignment, aircraft and system 
upgrades, and managing the home base location of aircraft.  These savings are achieved 
while also improving the quality of training and saving valuable hours on fleet aircraft.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Simulation of threat aircraft tactics and capabilities during training is an integral 
component of maintaining the combat readiness of the United States (U.S.) Navy.  Red 
air is the generic term for any aircraft and aircrew combination performing this mission. 
A dedicated adversary air force (ADFOR), consisting of the F-5 Tiger II, the F/A-18 
Hornet, and the F-16 Falcon, supports the majority of red air missions.  These airframes 
are aging and lack the sortie generation capacity and the performance capabilities to 
completely satisfy training requirements.  The U.S. Navy currently uses other opposition 
forces (OPFOR), such as contracted air services (CAS), or fleet aircraft flying in the 
adversary role, to fill the gap between the ADFOR capacity and the demand for training. 
This training gap will grow over the next decade as current airframes reach their flight 
hour limits.  
The biggest demand for adversary training events comes from the requirement to 
generate and maintain the readiness of fleet strike-fighter squadrons.  The Fleet Response 
Training Plan (FRTP) provides the overarching guidance regarding the training and 
readiness for naval forces.  Different training phases, as delineated in the FRTP, have 
corresponding training requirements that may call for the use of adversary aircraft.  The 
total adversary training requirement is a combination of required training events from 
different training phases, where a training event consists of a single adversary aircraft 
performing the red air mission.  Each training event demands different red air 
presentations that stress various training objectives. Often, training requires the 
combination of multiple adversary aircraft with different capabilities (multiple adversary 
events).   
This thesis presents the Adversary Sortie Optimization Tool (ADSOT), which 
uses an integer-linear program to optimize the assignment of red air sorties, for various 
opposition force platforms, to meet the annual fleet training demands over a 20-year 
planning horizon.  OPFOR platform options include ADFOR aircraft, CAS aircraft, or 
fleet aircraft flying the adversary role (commonly referred to as organic red air).  For a 
given procurement budget, ADSOT prescribes yearly upgrades specific to the ADFOR, 
xv i
including procurement of performance enhancing aircraft pods, improved radar, new 
aircraft and system upgrades.  ADSOT minimizes the operating cost and capability 
shortfall to provide an optimal yearly training plan over a 20-year planning horizon.  We 
use a training utility value to capture the quality of a particular solution as the percentage 
of the training objective met by prescribed OPFOR aircraft.  ADSOT imposes constraints 
that annually constrain and/or manage budgets, flight hours, aircraft inventory, CAS 
contract limits, and aircraft home base locations.  Output includes OPFOR yearly aircraft 
sortie assignment, projected yearly costs, projected yearly flight hour expenditure, and 
aggregated yearly training utility delivered. 
All ADSOT analysis uses input gathered from multiple fleet sources and is the 
result of extensive coordination with several subject matter experts.  Analysis of a base 
case derived from current resources and requirement verifies that the model effectively 
approximates the current use of OPFOR sorties to meet training requirements.  ADSOT 
excursions allow for various increases in procurement funding (injects).  These show that 
procurement in the near term will result in improved training utility values, while 
lowering both operating costs and the number of red air sorties flown by fleet aircraft.  
For a $300 million procurement inject, ADSOT sortie prescription increases overall 
training utility by as much as seven percent, decreased operating costs by $490 million 
over 20 years, and predicted a savings of over 250,000 flight hours on fleet aircraft.   
One ADSOT excursion considered the relaxation of ADFOR flight hour 
restrictions, aircraft base location, and planned procurement.  ADSOT achieved 
significant savings in both total flight hours and operating cost.  Over the 20-year 
planning horizon the fleet flight hour savings is over 100,000 hours and the operating 
cost savings is $720 million.  This was achieved while improving in training utility by up 
to six percent during some early years, and only minimally degrading training utility over 
some later years.  
Additional ADSOT excursions consider more advanced training requirements and 
investments into live, virtual, constructive (LVC) training ranges.  LVC ranges 
incorporate simulation technologies and computer generated adversaries into training to 
decrease the actual live adversary aircraft requirement.  In the case of more advanced 
x vii 
training requirements, the current OPFOR platforms have difficulty achieving an overall 
training utility value greater than 70 percent.  Even with an investment of $300 million 
the highest training utility achieved over any given year throughout the 20-year planning 
horizon is 79 percent.  A hypothetical LVC range is modeled with limited fidelity to 
improve performance of ADFOR aircraft when using the range.  Results indicated that 
improvements in training utility by over 10 percent annually over the base case are 
possible.  This improvement in training is also marked by a concurrent decrease in total 
operating cost by $1.7 billion dollars, and decrease in total fleet flight hour expenditure 
by 194,000 hours over the 20-year planning horizon. 
xvi ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
x ix 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Foremost, I thank my wife, Apryl.  Her love and support helped me to stay 
focused and driven while completing this challenging master’s program. 
I thank Professor Robert Dell for his patience, dedication, and guidance 
throughout the thesis process.  I can’t imagine a better working relationship between a 
thesis student and an advisor.  His mentorship kept me motivated, and his expertise has 
made me a better analyst. 
Commander Chris Marsh, my thesis sponsor from OPNAV N98, deserves special 
thanks for his encouragement and support.  This thesis would not have been possible if he 
didn’t believe in it from the beginning. 
Finally, I thank Professor Matthew Carlyle and Captain Jeffrey Hyink for their 
continued mentorship and candidness.  This thesis is better product as a result of their 
efforts.  
x x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Simulation of threat aircraft tactics and capabilities during training is an integral 
component of maintaining the combat readiness of the United States (U.S.) Navy.  Red 
air is the generic term for any aircraft and aircrew combination performing this mission. 
The U.S. Navy uses a dedicated adversary air force (ADFOR), consisting predominately 
of the F-5 Tiger II, to support the majority of red air missions.  The F-5 is an aging 
platform that lacks capability when compared with the fleet’s modern, more 
technologically advanced aircraft.  The ADFOR also operates some newer aircraft in 
limited numbers, including the F/A-18 Hornet and F-16 Falcon, but still cannot meet the 
training demands of the fleet.  The forecast is for this training gap to grow over the next 
decade as current airframes reach their flight hour limits.  The U.S. Navy currently uses 
other opposition forces (OPFOR), such as contracted air services (CAS), or fleet aircraft 
flying in the adversary role (commonly referred to as organic red air), to fill the gap.  
This thesis presents the Adversary Sortie Optimization Tool (ADSOT), which 
uses an integer-linear program to optimize the assignment of red air sorties, for various 
OPFOR platforms, to meet the fleet training demands over a 20-year planning horizon.  
OPFOR platform options include ADFOR aircraft, CAS aircraft, or organic red air. 
ADSOT allows for upgrades specific to the ADFOR, including procurement of 
performance enhancing aircraft pods, improved radar, new aircraft and system upgrades.  
As an analytical tool ADSOT provides the ability to conduct analysis of multiple aspects 
regarding how the Navy conducts adversary training.  This thesis focuses on the effects 
of different procurement dollar increases, or injects, into the system.  Additional 
excursions consider the effects of changing the requirements and the potential impact of 
upgrading training ranges to incorporate the live, virtual, constructive (LVC) concept. 
LVC ranges incorporate simulation technologies and computer generated adversaries into 
training to decrease the actual live adversary aircraft requirement (CDR R. Van Diepen, 
OPNAV Simulator Requirements Officer, personal communication, June, 2013).    
 2 
A. TRAINING REQUIREMENT 
Requirements for red air missions span many different platforms in the naval 
service and require adversaries with different capabilities.  Front line, fleet fighter pilots 
engage in basic fighter maneuvering (BFM) training in preparation for actual air-to-air 
combat. Other aviation platforms, such as the EA-6B “Prowler” and the H-60 “Seahawk” 
perform defensive maneuver training against adversary aircraft.  Surface combatants, 
such as destroyers and cruisers, require training against adversary aircraft in order to hone 
their anti-air capabilities.  Adversaries can also be used to simulate incoming missiles to 
test fleet defensive capabilities.  In the future, new platforms, such as the F-35 Joint 
Strike Fighter (JSF) (see Figure 1) will also require adversary support.   
The total adversary training requirement is a combination of required training 
events from different training phases, where a training event consists of a single 
adversary aircraft performing the red air mission.  Each training event demands different 
red air presentations that stress various training objectives. Often, training requires the 
combination of multiple adversary aircraft with different capabilities (multiple adversary 
events).   
 
Figure 1.   JSF F-35C in flight over the Atlantic Test Ranges.  Future platforms such as 
the F-35C will require adversary training into the latter half of the twenty-
first century (From Naval Air Systems Command, 2011a). 
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The biggest demand for adversary training events (and the focus of this thesis) 
comes from the requirement to generate and maintain the readiness of fleet strike-fighter 
squadrons.  The Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP) provides the overarching guidance 
regarding the training and readiness (T&R) for naval forces.  Different training phases, as 
delineated in the FRTP, have corresponding training requirements that may call for 
adversary aircraft.  Different training requirements for each phase can be further broken 
down into core and non-core events.  Core events require standardized, professional 
adversary support, from appropriately qualified OPFOR, and include training in 
conjunction with the following (Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center, 2012): 
• Strike-fighter advanced readiness program (SFARP); 
• Carrier air wing training (CVW Fallon); 
• Strike-fighter tactics instructor (SFTI) course (TOPGUN); and 
• Fleet replacement squadron (FRS) fighter weapons and tactics (FWT) 
phase. 
Both SFARP and CVW Fallon are training phases, approximately a month long, 
that an entire squadron or airwing, respectively, completes as a unit. SFTI and FRS are 
both individual orientated training.  Each aircrew must complete the FRS before joining 
an operational squadron; it is the basic level of strike-fighter training.  SFTI is the most 
advanced level of strike fighter training.  Otherwise known as TOPGUN, SFTI is a 
school where a select few, seasoned naval aviators attend to become subject matter 
experts (SMEs) in the art of strike-fighter tactics and execution.   
Non-core events are other training events that do not require professional 
adversary support.  Examples of non-core events include, but are not limited to: 
• Strike-fighter weapons and tactics (SFWT) sorties; 
• Joint task force exercise (JTFEX); 
• Composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX); and 
• Unit level training (ULT) sorties. 
JTFEX and COMPTUEX are training phases similar to SFARP and CVW Fallon, 
however the syllabi are not as stringently defined as that of the core events.  SFWT 
events consist of an individual aircrew executing a structured syllabus to progress 
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through different qualifications.  SFWT events can be completed in conjunction with 
other training events.  For example, during an SFARP syllabus flight a pilot can also get 
credit for an SFWT event.  
ULT events are unique in that they are often not delineated as a set syllabus with 
well-structured events.  ULT events are flights flown in addition to all the other training 
in order to maintain specified T&R readiness levels.  T&R credit is the common term for 
the amount of readiness credit an aircrew receives for performing a specific sortie.  This 
depends on multiple factors, such as sortie type, whether or not the flight occurred at 
night, or if the flight was against professional adversaries or not.  An aircrew accrues 
some T&R credit for every flight regardless of what training phase they are participating 
in at the time.  Most T&R readiness requirements are satisfied while conducting other 
core and non-core training events.  ULT events are additional flights required to satisfy 
any T&R readiness requirements that were not satisfied.   
Commander of Naval Air Forces (CNAF) maintains the capabilities-based T&R 
matrix, which provides specific details regarding the strike-fighter aircrew training 
requirement.  The T&R matrix is a tool developed to support the Department of Defense 
Readiness Reporting System—Navy (DRRS-N) by providing information regarding how 
many, and how often, each type of training event is required (Commander Naval Air 
Forces, 2012).  Figure 2 shows an excerpt of the current T&R matrix for the F/A-18-18C. 
The T&R matrix is unique for each aircraft type.  It prescribes tasks and skills, 
which must be completed within a given periodicity to support different T&R levels.  The 
“O” and “R” corresponds to whether or not a skill is “optional” or “required” for each 
task.  For example, for a pilot to be considered “ready” in the skill of “Counter EA” (next 
to last column), they must perform the skill a minimum of four times every 365 days.  
The have the option of performing the skill during either a AAW 110, “Counter EA 
(Electronic Attack)” task and or the AAW 210 “Counter Advanced EA” task (Note that 
this example only addresses fields shown in this excerpt from Figure 2.)  The T&R 
matrix also details different qualifications and events that a minimum number of aircrew 
of each squadron must complete, as shown in the additional excerpt of the T&R matrix 
(see Figure 3).  The column designations correspond to different qualifications that either 
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individuals or the squadron must complete.  For example, in the case of the “L3 pilots,” 
the squadron must have a minimum of seven to be considered “ready.”  In the case of the 
squadron assessments (last two columns), the squadron, as a whole, must complete 
(denoted as “SAT”). 
 
 
Figure 2.   Excerpt of the F/A-18C T&R matrix promulgated by CNAF. Columns 
include different aircrew skills.  Rows correspond to different T&R tasks, 
generally speaking, aircrew log one task per sortie. Not all tasks and skills are 
shown (After Commander of Naval Air Forces, 2011) 
The Marine Corps also requires adversary support that they provide primarily by 
their own dedicated ADFOR, a single squadron of F-5s that operate out of Yuma, 
Arizona. For the Marine Corps units that are integrated into Navy air wings, they 
progress through the FRTP as a Navy squadron, subject to the same Navy requirements.  
For this thesis, the specific Marine Corps adversary requirements, and ADFOR 
capabilities, are not addressed directly.  The requirements for Marine Corps units that are 




Figure 3.   Excerpt of the F/A-18C T&R matrix promulgated by CNAF (2011).  
Columns include different individual and squadron qualifications required. 
The row indicates either the minimum number of squadron aircrew required 
to complete or a “SAT” indicating the squadron must complete as a whole. 
B. ADVERSARY GAP 
The requirement for adversary training is difficult to quantify because of the 
diversity of demands requiring different training, however, it is abundantly clear that the 
fleet demand for adversary training exceeds the sortie capacity of the ADFOR.  The 
Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) estimates the total number of annual adversary training 
events at 38,000 (Huntzinger, Grund, & Luen, 2011).  With the addition of the JSF, and 
an increasing inventory of EA-18 Growlers to the U.S. Navy inventory, the requirements 
are expected to increase.  
In a more recent study, the commander for the Tactical Support Wing (TSW) 
responsible for the airframes and aircrew that make up the ADFOR, Captain (CAPT) 
Nichols (2012), estimates the demand for adversary training events at 33,933 events 
annually (see Table 1).  By all estimates, the requirement for adversary training is 
significantly higher than the computed ADFOR annual capacity of 16,093 sorties 
(including CAS aircraft).  The capacity assumes that each adversary aircraft flies an 
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average of 327.6 hours per year and the average length of each sortie is 1.18 hours 
(Nichols, 2012). 
 
Table 1.   Demand for annual training compared to ADFOR sortie capacity by aircraft 
type as estimated by the TSW.  Both core and non-core events are included.  
This assumes no double cycle capability from the ADFOR for capacity 
calculations.  Also, note that CAS type IV support is included in capacity 
calculations (After Nichols, 2012). 
In some cases, adversary aircraft can satisfy the requirement for multiple events 
through a practice commonly referred to as double cycling.  Double cycling is the 
practice of an adversary aircraft remaining airborne long enough to provide training for 
two separate blue force waves.  The result is longer sortie lengths but the ability to meet 
the demand for multiple training events.  Even considering an optimistic double cycle 
capability of 33 percent of the total events, the capacity gap between the demand for 
training and the number of sorties that the ADFOR can provide is still significant at 
sorties.   
ADFOR sortie capacity depends on an aging inventory of ADFOR aircraft.  
Figure 4 depicts the past and projected inventory of ADFOR from 2008 through 2029, 
including aircraft operated by the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center (NSAWC), and 
the reserve component (RC).  The current inventory of F-16 A/B and F-5 N/F will 




Figure 4.   ADFOR projected aircraft inventory levels from 2008 through 2029.  With no 
replacement funded for F-5 and F-16 aircraft the ADFOR inventory is 
expected to drop.  NSAWC and RC aircraft are both considered part of the 
ADFOR (After Nichols, 2012) 
In addition to an inadequate sortie capacity, current adversary platforms are also 
challenged to properly represent advanced threat aircraft.  The U.S. Navy originally 
designed the F-5 (see Figure 5) in the 1950s to fulfill a requirement to operate a small, 
lightweight fighter, flying off of smaller escort carriers.  Despite being updated numerous 
 
Figure 5.   Navy F-5 from VFC-111 in Key West, FL.  F-5 aircraft make up the majority 
of the ADFOR despite being more than a generation removed from the 
modern fleet fighters they train against (From NAVAIR, n.d.) 
 9 
times since inception, the F-5 lacks many of the capabilities desired for present day 
adversary training.  The F-5 is not nearly as maneuverable, and lacks the technologically 
advanced weapons systems of more modern threat aircraft.  Figure 6 shows a depiction of 
the F-5 capabilities when compared to possible threat aircraft currently operated abroad.  
The color-coding of “green”, “yellow”, and “red” corresponds to the ability of the F-5 to 
simulate the different aircraft as “good”, “marginal”, and “none” respectively.  In general, 
the F-5 does not provide the desired threat representation capability. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Excerpt from brief on F-5 Avionics systems.  Depicted is the capability 
shortfall of the F-5 to be able to simulate different threat aircraft.  Beyond 
visual range (BVR) and within visual range (WVR) correspond to specific air 
combat regimes. Colors “Green”, “Yellow”, and “Red” correspond 
respectively to “good”, “marginal”, and “none” capability simulation (From 
Taylor, 2012). 
The discussion focus has been on the F-5 because it contributes 67 percent of all 
ADFOR sorties (Roy, 2013).  However, there are also capability shortfalls present with 
the other ADFOR platforms.  The F-16s do not have powerful enough radar systems to 
adequately simulate the threat aircraft for many of the red air missions.  They also lack 
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technologically advanced systems such as high off-boresight (HOBS) weapons systems.  
The ADFOR F/A-18s are older model Hornets that also do not have many of the 
upgraded weapons systems of the newer fleet aircraft.  In addition, the F/A-18 is 
considered to be similar to other aircraft in the fleet, and dissimilarity is a highly desired 
characteristic for adversary training.   
The sortie capacity shortfall and the ADFOR aircraft capability shortfall together 
make up a significant adversary gap.  The U.S. Navy faces this growing gap with no clear 
solution in place for the future.  
C. THESIS SCOPE 
This thesis analyzes the current and future U.S. Navy fleet of adversary support 
aircraft.  Currently the Navy primarily relies on three different aircraft to provide 
adversary support, the F-5 Tiger II, the F-16 Falcon and the F/A-18 Hornet.  CAS 
aircraft, operated by civilian companies such as Airborne Tactical Advantage Company 
(ATAC), supplement the ADFOR.  The annual cost to provide this adversary support is 
in the billions of dollars.  In light of the proliferation of advanced threat aircraft 
worldwide, which are one to two generations ahead of our capability to represent in 
training, and forced retirement of older adversary aircraft, an optimized future adversary 
aircraft structure is paramount.  This thesis provides a mathematical model to optimize 
the Navy’s future fleet of adversary support aircraft. 
The scope of this thesis includes aspects of the Navy adversary training 
requirements and the platforms to provide adversary training support.  The specific naval 
inventory considered for the ADFOR includes the following squadrons (location); VFC-
13 (Fallon, NV), NSAWC (Fallon, NV), VFC-111 (Key West, FL), VFC-12 (Oceana, 
VA), and VFA-204 (New Orleans, LA).  CAS, and organic adversary support is also 
included.  All budgetary figures are in terms of constant FY13$.   
In chapter II we discuss the relevant background, in chapter III we present 
ADSOT, in chapter IV we present the results of analyzing four scenarios, and we 
conclude in chapter V with insights we have gained and suggestions for further study. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
Air superiority is integral to success in modern armed conflict.  This axiom was 
foundational to combat success in battles such as the invasion of Normandy, during 
World War II, and to the more recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Precedence has 
been given to establishing air superiority before other tasks, even in smaller, limited 
operations such as Operation Odyssey Dawn, in Libya.  As a result, no U.S. service 
members have been killed by an enemy air attack since three were killed during the 
Korean War (Roughton, 2013).  Enemy aircraft employing air-to-air missiles, air-to-
surface missiles, and bombs can jeopardize air superiority and endanger friendly forces.  
A standing air force of appreciable size with an appropriate level of proficiency is 
required to ensure air superiority.  This requires the execution of a robust training 
syllabus, including air combat training against a capable adversary. 
Adequate training ensures that our forces are ready when called upon.  It is 
dangerous, dynamic training, demanding the highest level of aircrew skill and 
competency.  The combat capability of naval forces depends not only on the technology 
of the systems employed, but also the degree to which a well-trained operator can employ 
the weapons systems.  For the training to be effective, the aircrew and aircraft simulating 
the enemy have to be representative of current and future threats.  As recently as the 
1980’s actual foreign military aircraft were used in the adversary role.  The U.S. Air 
Force had multiple classified programs, which acquired Soviet made Mikoyan (MiG) 
fighters from countries with crumbling economies.   Both Navy and Air Force fighter 
pilots trained against MiG-17s, MiG-21s and MiG-23s at remote training ranges in 
Nevada (Davies, 2008).  
A. THE RED AIR MISSION  
Performing the red air mission involves an in-depth knowledge of threat tactics 
and the ability to execute those tactics effectively while airborne.  This requires a skilled 
aircrew that can make real time assessments regarding blue force performance, and an 
appropriate aircraft that effectively simulates threat aircraft performance.  NSAWC is the 
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Navy Command responsible for standardization of adversary training, and promulgation 
of the specific adversary requirements.  NSAWC defines a professional adversary aircrew 
as one that has completed the appropriate level of the approved adversary syllabus 
(NSAWC, 2012).  The intensive syllabus focuses on aircraft handling, threat aircraft 
performance and tactics, and the ability to recall all aspects of the flight in order to 
discuss training lessons learned with blue forces.   
B. ADVERSARY TRAINING PLATFORMS AND CAPABILITIES 
The primary method that the Navy uses to meet the demand for adversary training 
is professional adversary pilots flying ADFOR aircraft.  If the ADFOR isn’t available, 
then organic red air, and CAS can be used.  Flight simulators can also be used for some 
very specific training, although they are limited by their lack of realism in many aspects 
of flight.  Combinations of flight simulators and real aircraft are currently being explored 
in a concept known as LVC (CDR R. Van Diepen, OPNAV Simulator Requirements 
Officer, personal communication, June, 2013).  Understanding the capabilities and 
limitations of each different platform is essential to providing adequate training.  
Aircraft capabilities such as speed, maneuverability, and weapon systems define 
an aircraft’s “generation.”  Of course, these very broad categories are open to 
interpretation.  Figure 7 shows a generally accepted breakdown of fighter aircraft 
generations. The R3 descriptor is another accepted way to describe aircraft.  An R3 
aircraft is one that: uses a radar to track air targets; employs a radar warning receiver to 
determine if itself is being targeting; and is able to react tactically in an attempt to defeat 
enemy radar lock or subsequent air-to-air missiles.  A Non-R3 aircraft is simply one that 
lacks this capability combination.   
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Figure 7.   Category description for different generations of modern fighter aircraft.  
U.S. Navy ADFOR aircraft are in bold.  The F-5 makes up the majority of the 
ADFOR although only considered a third generation fighter (After Tirpak, 
2009). 
1. Adversary Air Force (ADFOR) 
The ADFOR primarily consists of naval reserve squadrons operating the F-5 
Tiger and the F/A-18A/C Hornet, supplemented by F-16 Falcon and F/A-18E/F Super 
Hornet aircraft operated and maintained by NSAWC.  At publication, this amounted to 
97 total ADFOR aircraft with an aggregate sortie capacity of approximately 15,000 




Table 2.   Inventory of the number of aircraft assigned to each squadron.  This does 
not necessarily reflect the number of aircraft available for training.  
Maintenance demands often cause sustained periods of aircraft 
unavailability (LCDR G. Hughes, CNAFR TACAIR Program Manager, 
personal communication, December, 2012).  
The F-5 Tiger II makes up the majority of the ADFOR with a total of 32 aircraft.  
Two variants of the Tiger II are currently in use by the Navy: the F-5N and a two-seat 
variant, the F-5F.  NSAWC considers the F-5 a third generation aircraft.  It is supersonic, 
and comes equipped with the AN/APQ-159 pulse radar, which provides air-to-air search 
for target detections with range and azimuth at a range up to 20 nm.  
Compared to the Navy’s more modern air force, the F-5 is over matched.  It is 
only moderately maneuverable, not considered R3 due to a weak radar with no radar 
warning receiver, and does not completely fulfill the requirements for many of the 
adversary-required events.  The radar is not representative of the threat aircraft and only 
useful at relatively short ranges.  This restricts the F-5’s usefulness on some of the more 
advanced training events.  The F-5 is extremely cost effective, and operated abroad by 
many nations, including the U.S. recognized threat nation of Iran. 
The F-16 Falcon is perhaps the most formidable ADFOR aircraft when it comes 
to BFM training events.  This is the typical dogfight type of air combat, where both 
aircraft maintain sight of each other, and are trying to maneuver in able to shoot the other 
at relatively short range.  NSAWC operates 14 of these fourth generation aircraft, of both 
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A and B variants.  They are equipped with the AN/APG-66/68 radar warning system, 
which provides a decent R3 capability and a short to medium range radar.  
Versions of both the F/A-18A-D Hornet and the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet are also 
flown by the ADFOR.  These fourth generation aircraft are on par in many regards with 
the fleet F/A-18s. They are highly maneuverable with an advanced R3 suite, providing 
medium range radar resolution with the APG-65 and APG-73 radar.  However, they lack 
many of the upgraded weapon systems that the fleet carries such as the active 
electronically scanned array (AESA) long range radar and HOBS systems. They also do 
not satisfy the requirement to perform adversary training against dissimilar aircraft.   
Both the current F-16s and a large portion of the F/A-18s used by the ADFOR are 
severely restricted in the number of remaining flight hours they can fly before reaching 
the airframe limit.  Effectively, by the year 2020 the ADFOR stands to lose 42 aircraft, or 
47 percent of its sortie capacity (Roy, 2013).  Although there are multiple programs to 
increase the flight hour availability for both aircraft, there is limited funding.  Initially the 
F-16 aircraft were limited to 3,000 hours.  FALCON UP, funded at $8M in 2013, 
increases the hour limit of the F-16 to 4,250 hours (Blair, 2013).  Another program, 
FALCON STAR, would increase the limit further to 8,000, however, it has little promise 
of receiving funding (LCDR G. Hughes, CNAFR TACAIR Program Manager, personal 
communication, August, 2013).  The service life extension program (SLEP) for the F/A-
18 has been effective in increasing flight hour limit to 8,600 for most aircraft.  
a. ADFOR Procurement and Upgrades 
Multiple options for procurement and upgrades to the ADFOR exist.  One of the 
most significant recent upgrades was the procurement of electronic attack (EA) digital 
radio frequency memory (DRFM) pods.  Electronic attack is an action to impede the 
enemy’s use of some aspect of the electromagnetic spectrum.  Aircraft carrying the 
DRFM pods can jam enemy radar, making it difficult for them to be targeted.  
Acquisition of these pods significantly enhances the capability of the ADFOR and 
enables advanced training, which was previously unavailable.  Pods are typically 
externally mounted on the aircraft, as is the case for the F-16 and F/A-18, however for the 
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F-5 it is carried internally.  This is an important difference, as the externally mounted 
pods are much easier to rotate between aircraft; therefore, more use can be obtained from 
each individual pod.   
Other pods are being considered but have not been procured yet.  The SLEEPER 
pod is an emulator that can be used to mimic different threat aircraft systems and increase 
the radar range indications of the operating aircraft.  An infrared search and track (IRST) 
pod is available that will provide a method for tracking objects that give off infrared 
radiation, heat.   
Some more permanent upgrades to the airframes are also available.  Upgrades to 
the radar system of both the F-5 and the F-16 could drastically improve their R3 
capability.  Improvements would include increased search and track capabilities, and in 
the case of the F-5, data recording and a radar warning receiver.  A HOBS, which 
increases the BFM capability of aircraft is readily available and can be installed in the F-
5 and F-16.  A joint helmet mounting cueing system (JHMCS), in conjunction with the 
AIM-9X, is already used by fleet forces and can be added to the ADFOR F/A-18s to 
provide a similar capability. 
b. Event Multiplier and Double Cycle Events  
It is often the case that a single red air sortie can meet multiple event 
requirements.  This can occur when multiple aircrew that require training are in the same 
flight.  This is common in the FRS phase, where a flight of four aircraft typically contains 
two or three aircrew that are satisfying multiple syllabus requirements simultaneously.   
Double cycling adversaries can also enable single red air sorties to meet multiple 
event requirements.  Double cycling is the practice of adversary aircraft launching on a 
single sortie, providing red air presentations for multiple successive blue force events.  
For example, an event multiplier of 1.86 (Price & Doll, 2012) was computed for VFC-12.  
Assuming this was accomplished solely by double cycling, that equates to approximately 
13 blue events supported for every seven red air missions.  More explicitly, out of seven 
aircraft, six engaged double cycle events.  
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A consequence of using double cycle adversary aircraft is that each aircraft has 
less fuel for each event, and therefore less time to dedicate to the blue force training.  In 
order to be able to double cycle these types of events, the adversaries often fly at slower, 
more fuel conserving air speeds in order to be able to remain airborne long enough to 
support multiple events.  This results in a “watered down” training which may be 
adequate for the FRS event but not for other levels of training.  If the requirement calls 
for multiple presentations at tactical airspeeds, double cycling the red air may be 
infeasible. 
2. Contracted Air Service (CAS) 
The use of CAS to provide adversary support has grown in popularity and utility.  
CAS provides a diversified range of aircraft, with a sortie “on demand” capability.  In 
May, 2013, ATAC announced that it had flown over 30,000 (Bannon, 2013) hours in 
support of the Navy and Air Force.  This type of support has proven integral in 
supplementing the limited sortie capacity of the ADFOR.   
ATAC and L-3 Communications Flight International Aviation LLC are two CAS 
providers currently under contract by the DoD.  ATAC maintains a fleet of 23 aircraft, 
which includes five F-21 Kfir (see Figure 8), four L-39 Albatross, and 14 MK-58 Hawker 
Hunters.  This gives ATAC the capability to provide both a third and fourth generation 
threat simulation.  L-3 operates a fleet of Learjets, which can be configured with pods to 
conduct electronic attack (EA) red air missions.  Draken International, a prospective 
CAS provider, announced in July that it had entered into a contract with a Polish 
company to acquire 25 Russian made Mig-21 front line fighter aircraft (Draken 
International, 2012), and will be competing for work from the DoD.  The Mig-21 is one 
of the most proliferated fighters in the world and provides an exceptional training 
capability against a real world third generation threat.  The range of aircraft and 




Figure 8.   The Israeli produced F-21 Kfir fighter is operated by ATAC and is one of 
many aircraft available for contract service from private industry. (From 
ATAC, n.d.) 
3. Organic Adversaries 
A common practice in the fleet is to use other fleet assets to perform adversary 
training.  For example, four aircraft from the same squadron alternate training in a two-
versus-two scenario, in which they alternate flying in the adversary role.  This is 
commonly referred to as organic adversary support, as generally the aircraft come from 
the same squadron or same air-wing.  This type of training requires little coordination and 
can be effective for certain training objectives.  However, there are some concerns 
regarding the use of organic adversaries.  Very few fleet aircrew are professional 
adversary pilots, therefore there are some limitations on which training events can be 
performed with organic adversaries. 
The cost of supplying organic adversaries can be high.  Between 2006 and 2010 
the cost of operating an F-5 was as much as 31 percent lower than that of an F/A-18.  




Table 3.   Flight hour cost comparison between F-5 and a fleet F/A-18 (After 
Huntzinger et al., 2011). All dollars are $FY11.    
There is also an opportunity cost of flying valuable flight hours on a fleet F/A-18.  
These aircraft must be removed from service after reaching 8,600 hours.  In 2010 it was 
estimated that there would be a shortfall of approximately 100 Navy F/A-18s 
approaching the year 2020.  In a statement to the House Armed Service Committee in 
March of 2012, the strike-fighter shortfall was projected to be less than previously 
thought, but still roughly 65 aircraft (Department of the Navy’s Aviation, 2012).  The real 
cost of flying red air sorties with fleet aircraft goes beyond the higher operating cost, it 
also accelerates the attrition of assets that have finite flight hour restrictions in the face of 
a predicted shortfall within a decade. 
4. Simulators 
Technology developments over the past two decades have dramatically increased 
the fidelity of flight simulators and training via simulation.  The ability to accurately 
depict real combat scenarios continues to improve.  Almost all levels of aircrew training 
in the U.S. Navy involve some amount of simulator use.  A limitation of simulation is 
that it does not provide “end-to-end” training.  “End-to-end” training occurs when the 
entire system of getting an airplane and aircrew combination ready for combat occurs; 
loaded with the appropriate ordnance, aircraft maintained properly and ready to fly, and a 
sufficiently trained and capable aircrew.  Current simulators leave much to be desired in 
the simulation of air-to-air combat.  They do not provide for many of the sensory inputs 
that come from increased G-forces, and spatial disorientation that are often encountered 
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during a real flight.  They also are lacking in the high fidelity visual cueing required for 
practicing close in BFM training.   
5. Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) 
The LVC concept is loosely defined as any training in which these three elements 
are involved.  
• Live—real people operating real equipment; 
• Virtual—real people operating simulators; and 
• Constructive—computer generated entities. 
Currently, there is on-going development in the Navy to incorporate the LVC 
concept into training.  LVC ranges would be able to supplement the current capabilities 
of ADFOR aircraft in order to make them more representative of threat aircraft.  They 
also would be able to provide virtual and constructive targets, which would serve as a 
force multiplier for adversary training presentations.  As an example, a training event 
requiring six adversary aircraft simulating fourth generation aircraft could be 
accomplished with just two F-5s.  LVC ranges come at a high cost and at a minimum, 
would consist of updating range antennas, updating pods for the aircraft, and an overhaul 
of existing computers and encryption in the range operations centers (CDR R. Van 
Diepen, OPNAV Simulator Requirements Officer, personal communication, June, 2013).  
C. PAST STUDIES  
Previous attempts have been made to address red air shortfalls and potential 
changes to ADFOR. CNA completed two studies, one as recent as 2012, addressing these 
issues.  Both studies proposed solutions to meet the future demand for red air involving 
various upgrades to the force and changes to the utilization of CAS.  Multiple Master’s 
degree theses have been completed using simple calculus, and statistics approaches, to 
address the adversary gap.  Finally, optimization has demonstrated effectiveness for 
similar DoD applications. 
CNA (Huntzinger et al., 2011) at the request of OPNAV N88 (now N98), used a 
capabilities based assessment (CBA) to conduct a study of adversary requirements 
through 2025.  Assuming about 25 percent of adversary cost goes into overhead, they 
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estimated that the annual cost of an ADFOR of sufficient size to meet the training 
requirements was about $530 million.  This was $48 million less than what was currently 
estimated as being spent on the ADFOR, and suggested that there was room for some 
cost savings by not flying fleet aircraft in the adversary role, and using the money saved 
to buy better adversary support.  This option also included using more CAS to 
supplement the existing ADFOR.  In order to facilitate the study, CNA (Huntzinger et al., 
2011) developed an alternative method for classification of the adversary requirements.  
Their method uses five general levels of capability that provide more fidelity than the 
generation categories or the “R3 and non-R3” grouping currently used and focuses on the 
capability required for training rather than the aircraft.  This enabled aggregation of the 
training requirements throughout the different training cycles of the FRTP.  Table 4 
shows the study’s recommended force structure and the number of sorties required.  
 
 
Table 4.   CNA study results of proposed adversary platform upgrades and the number 
of sorties required to meet the training demand. (After Huntzinger et al., 
2011) 
A second study, at the request of CNAF, to analyze where improvements to 
ADFOR could be made, and what possible secondary benefits active duty component 
units achieved flying red air sorties, followed the initial CNA work.  In order to 
accomplish this, Price and Doll (2012) developed multiple models and analyzed data 
from 31 pilots attached to CVW-1 during their training in preparation for deployment.  
Focus was on the sustainment level training for the core events only. They leveraged the 
 22 
requirement categorization system used in the previous CNA adversary study 
(Huntzinger et al., 2011).  Price and Doll (2012) found that fleet pilots flying the 
adversary role accrued as much T&R credit as 57 percent of a flight flown as blue air.  
This is a significant observation, noting that when squadrons use organic red air they do 
accrue T&R credit.  This would mean that if exclusively ADFOR or CAS aircraft flew 
red air sorties, readiness of the fleet would be negatively impacted, as there would be a 
loss of those training flight hours.  However, if those hours were re-capitalized for more 
fleet training, this would not be the case and a higher level of proficiency could be 
attained.  Also significant in the study was their preliminary work regarding the relative 
cost-benefit from different upgrades of the ADFOR.  Price and Doll used an optimization 
approach using simulated annealing to seek optimized upgrades for the ADFOR.  They 
found that there was a clear dominance of the radar system improvements, including R3 
enhancements, over any other upgrades, but they provide no measure of the optimality of 
their solution.  
Integral to the model developed by CNA were the utility assignments for each 
airframe and upgrade combination (see Figure 9).  The utility value of 1.0 equates to a 
platform configuration that completely meets the requirement.  A value of 0.0 equates a 
platform configuration that does not meet the requirement at all.  Other values between 
0.0 and 1.0 indicate varying degrees of utility and are color-coded.  A short explanation is 
provided if the utility value is not 1.0.  Using a simulated annealing heuristic algorithm in 
conjunction with the utility assignments, CNA found, in order of priority, that the 
following upgrades returned the greatest targeted capability improvements, when mapped 
to the requirements, on investments up to $250–300 million: 
• R3 upgrades to F-16s and F-5s; 
• DRFM EA upgrades; and 




Figure 9.   Excerpt of table depicting utility assignments from CNA 2012 study.  The 
columns represent the capability binning of the requirements used from the 
CNA 2011 study.  The rows each correspond to an aircraft and upgrade 
combination.  The colors correspond to the amount of utility for each 
requirement and aircraft configuration combination.  (From Price & Doll, 
2012) 
After $300 million, CNA found that procurement of additional F-16s was required 
to make further significant improvements to the adversary fleet.  It is important to note 
that the above results were not completely modeled in the CNA study, and they 
acknowledge that much more work by their SMEs needs to be conducted. 
Roy (2013) attempted the task of quantifying the actual adversary capability 
shortfall through the use of survey analysis.  Roy conducted surveys of two separate air-
wings after completing the SFARP and CVW Fallon training phases.  He asked a series 
 24 
of questions related to the quality of training and the quality of the adversary 
representation given.  He showed that there is agreement amongst fleet pilots that the 
existing ADFOR is not capable of meeting the training objectives in the future.   
Brazelton, Hughes and Pearce (2010) took a more mathematical approach in their 
capstone project, focusing on a single squadron located in Key West, to compare 
capabilities and limitations with requirements during the FRS training phase.  VFC-111 
in Key West is the primary provider for FRS adversary training support.  According to 
Brazelton et al., VFC-111 had a support capacity of 3,273 sorties in FY2011.  This is 
based on an annual flight hour budget of 4,800 hours, an overhead requirement of 25 
percent, and an average of 1.1 flight hours per sortie.  They compute this at 321 sorties 
below the requirement of 3,594.  These sorties do not correspond directly to the number 
of events required.  The FRS uses a high rate of double cycle red air and only meets the 
minimum required adversary aircraft for each syllabus hop.  Brazelton et al., found the 
FRS demand peaked in 2011 and will remain high through at least 2015 when the Joint 
Strike Fighter FRS begins conducting training.  They found that the lack of adversary 
support was the single largest limiting factor in completing the FRS air-to-air training 
requirements and concluded that in order to meet the demand, VFC-111 would need two 
additional aircraft, at least two additional aircrew, and to increase funding to support 
5,600 flight hours per year. 
There is precedence using optimization models to address similar scheduling 
problems in the Navy. Madson (2010) developed an integer linear program for the 
scheduling squadrons to match air-wing assignments.  Her model showed the number of 
squadron moves could be decreased from eleven to five in the first year through more 
efficient planning.  Garcia (2001) built on a integer linear program by both Baran (2000) 
and Field (1999), for planning the procurement and retirement of both ships and aircraft.  
Garcia effectively modeled specifics of aircraft planning including factors such as: 
increasing operations and maintenance costs as aircraft age increases; varying mission 
effectiveness based on aircraft age; and the use of unmanned air vehicles (UAV).  The 
study showed that increasing aircraft ages have direct impact on the optimal procurement 
and retirement planning. 
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Brown (1995) developed a bicriteria mixed integer program to address scheduling 
of Marine Corps aviation units in order to maintain readiness in accordance with the T&R 
program.  The model maximized readiness over a 90-day schedule while enforcing T&R 
requirements and squadron manning constraints.  His model solved in as little as 10 
minutes on a personal computer.  Brown also incorporated a notion he referred to as 
“equity” which attempted to capture the practice of units to “pursue equity of opportunity 
and workload among individuals to preserve morale” (Brown, 1995).  He found that a 
schedule could be developed that approached optimal readiness levels while reducing 
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III. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
A. ADVERSARY SORTIE OPTIMIZATION TOOL (ADSOT)  
ADSOT is an integer linear program that prescribes the annual assignment and 
procurement of specifically configured adversary training platform to meet red air 
mission requirements.  ADSOT accomplishes this while minimizing cumulative 
operating costs and penalties associated with platform capability and training requirement 
mismatches.   Budget parameters, contracting limits, procurement schedules, annual 
flight hour usage, and aircraft flight hour limits all constrain the results.  ADSOT 
prescribes annual operating cost, procurement cost, training utility, aircraft retirement 
schedules, and procurement schedules over a 20-year planning horizon with annual 
fidelity. 
B. MAJOR PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Training Platforms 
Three categories of training platform considered for the red air mission are: 
dedicated ADFOR, CAS, and fleet aircraft (organic red air).  LVC model excursions 
integrate into ADFOR as a force multiplier when enabled.  ADSOT can prescribe aircraft 
upgrades and pod configurations in order to improve performance for the ADFOR only.  
The number of events each ADFOR can satisfy is specifically constrained by aircraft 
inventory, annual flight hour limits, and aircraft home base location.  ADSOT constrains 
multiple CAS aircraft configurations by the service contract, aircraft home base location, 
and capability limitations.  ADSOT allows the use of fleet aircraft subject to capability 
limitations.  ADSOT does not model any procurement or flight hour parameters for fleet 
aircraft. 
2. Sorties and Events 
ADSOT prescribes sorties from the eligibly configured training platforms to meet 
required training events.  Each sortie has the ability to satisfy multiple events based on an 
event multiplier (in some cases the event multiplier is one).  Each specific requirement 
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location and the home base location of the servicing training platform are used to 
determine both the event multiplier the average sortie duration. 
3. Requirements 
The requirements include both core and non-core events including: FRS, SFARP, 
CVW Fallon, SFTI, COMPTUEX, JTFEX, STWT and ULT (T&R required) training 
phases.  Each adversary required equates to an event requirement.  For example, if a FRS 
syllabus flight requires four adversaries, then that equates to four required events. 
 ADSOT uses requirement bins as developed by CNA (Huntzinger et al., 2011).  
These bins enable the aggregation of requirements into 13 different categories allowing 
for efficient computation of the data, and for ease in presentation of information.  Note 
that although ADSOT uses requirement bins, the specific training phase and location for 
each requirement is still preserved.  This enables differentiation of the ability to meet 
requirements for different training phases, allowing ADSOT increased fidelity to identify 
specific shortages.  Table 5 depicts the different requirement bins used for ADSOT, with 
a detailed description of each. 
ADSOT defines different training platform capabilities to be mapped both to the 
requirement bins and the different training platform configurations.  Table 6 shows the 
different capability categories.  ADSOT uses the capabilities to develop training utility 
values.  These values correspond to the ability of each platform to meet the requirements.  
Training utilities range between zero and one, with one representing a training platform 





Table 5.   Requirement bins used in ADSOT.  Binning enables similar requirements 
from all training phases to be aggregated together for ease of model 
computation.  Example events requiring the associated training with each 
bin is provided.  (After Huntzinger et al., 2011).   
4. Costs 
ADSOT minimizes operational and maintenance cost based on cost per flight 
hour (CPH) for each training platform.  Location of the training demand, location of 
OPFOR provider, and duration of training event influence the number of flight hours 
executed.  Procurement costs are modeled as one-time procurement injects and annual 
allowances.  Options for use of procurement dollars are limited to new ADFOR aircraft, 
ADFOR upgrades, and performance enhancing pods for ADFOR aircraft. 
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5. Training Platform Capabilities 
 
 
Table 6.   Training platform capabilities, descriptions and sample capable aircraft.  
These capabilities are used to formulate training utility values.  
6. Penalties 
ADSOT objective function coefficients are equal to the CPH for each training 
platform.  The objective function also uses a penalty to account for any capability deficit.  
This capability penalty guides ADSOT to always assign the most capable available 




SETS AND INDICES  
 
   ADFOR aircraft:   
  ADFOR aircraft type groups  
   ADFOR aircraft groups   
   CAS types  
   fleet aircraft  
   locations:   
   aircraft performance enhancing pod configurations:   
    aircraft pods  that are part of configuration :   
    aircraft  that can carry configuration   
   requirements  
   training ranges  
  upgrades available for aircraft :   
   years of the planning horizon:   
  available procurement intervals (between years and year   
   ,inclusive) for aircraft   
  available procurement intervals (between years and year   
   ,inclusive) for pod    
 available procurement intervals (between years and year   
   ,inclusive) for aircraft upgrades to   
PARAMETERS 
 
 Objective-terms: Penalties 
  penalty for shortage in capability for requirement in year  ($/sortie) 
  penalty for expenditure excess of total budget in ($/$) 
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  penalty for expenditure shortage of total budget in ($/$)  
 penalty for expenditure excess of total operations budget in ($/$) 
 penalty for expenditure shortage of total operations budget in ($/$) 
 penalty for expenditure excess of ADFOR operations budget in ($/$) 
  penalty for expenditure shortage of ADFOR operations budget in ($/$) 
  penalty for expenditure excess of procurement budget in ($/$) 
  penalty for expenditure shortage of procurement budget in ($/$) 
 penalty for expenditure excess of CAS budget in ($/$) 
 penalty for expenditure shortage of CAS budget in ($/$) 
 Airframe Data 
   initial inventory of aircraft  at location  (# aircraft) 
   maximum inventory of aircraft in group  at location  (# aircraft) 
   minimum inventory of aircraft in group  at location  (# aircraft) 
   maximum flight hours for aircraft  in year  (# hour) 
   minimum flight hours for aircraft  in year  (# hour) 
 hours required for training platform from location to meet requirement   
  (# hour) 
 hours required for single sortie to meet requirement  (# hour) 
 base flight hours already flown for aircraft  procured in year  (# hour) 
 flight hours flown for aircraft  in year  procured in  (# hour) 
 maximum flight hour life for aircraft (# hour) 
 percentage of flight hours flown as overhead for aircraft (hour/hour) 
 Other Platforms Data 
 initial inventory of pods  at location  (# pod) 
 one if pod  is used in pod configuration      
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  multiplier for the frequency to use pod  for aircraft  (sortie/sortie) 
 initial inventory of training ranges  (# range) 
 maximum capacity of training ranges  (# sortie) 
 multiplier of additional sorties capability when using aircraft  to meet  
  requirement  on training range  (# sortie)  
 maximum hours to fly with CAS  in year  (# sortie) 
 minimum hours to fly with CAS  in year  (# sortie) 
 maximum sorties to fly with fleet aircraft  in year  (# sortie)  
 maximum sorties to fly with fleet aircraft  (# sortie)  
 Requirement Data 
 number of events needed to meet requirement  in year  (# event) 
 number of requirements   met with each sortie from location  (# event) 
 number of requirements   met with each sortie (sortie/event) 
 effectiveness of airframe  with pod  to meet requirement   
  (sortie/event)  
 effectiveness of CAS aircraft  to meet requirement  (sortie/sortie)  
  effectiveness of fleet aircraft  to meet requirement  (sortie/sortie) 
 effectiveness of aircraft  to meet requirement on training range   
  (# sortie) 
 Procurement Parameters 
  final year for procurement (year) 
 maximum total number of aircraft  to procure (# aircraft) 
 minimum total number of aircraft  to procure (# aircraft) 
 maximum number of aircraft  to procure in year  (# aircraft) 
 minimum number of aircraft  to procure in year  (# aircraft) 
 maximum total number of pod  to procure (# pod) 
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 minimum total number of pod  to procure (# pod) 
 maximum number of pod  to procure in year  (# pod) 
 minimum number of pod  to procure in year  (# pod) 
 maximum total number of upgrade  to procure (# upgrade) 
 minimum total number of upgrade  to procure (# upgrade) 
 maximum number of upgrade  to procure in year  (# upgrade) 
 minimum number of upgrade  to procure in year  (# upgrade) 
 Budget Parameters 
 operating CPH cost of aircraft  in year ($/sortie) 
 contracting  CPH cost of CAS  in year ($/sortie) 
 fleet cost of  CPH fleet  in year ($/sortie) 
 procurement cost of aircraft  in year ($/aircraft) 
 procurement cost of pod  for aircraft  ($/pod) 
 upgrade cost of aircraft  upgraded to aircraft  in year  ($/upgrade) 
 cost of training range  in year ($/training range) 
 cost of to transfer aircraft  to a new location ($/transfer aircraft) 
 maximum ADFOR operating cost budget in year ($) 
 minimum ADFOR operating cost budget in year ($) 
  maximum procurement budget in year ($) 
  minimum procurement budget in year ($) 
 maximum total red air operating cost budget in year ($) 
 minimum total red air operating cost budget in year ($) 
 maximum CAS cost budget in year ($) 
 minimum CAS cost budget in year ($) 
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 maximum procurement ($) 
DECISION VARIABLES 
 
 Elastic Variables 
  objective function value 
  requirement  capability shortage in year  (# sortie) 
  requirement  capacity shortage in year  (# sortie) 
  amount over allowed ADFOR operations budget year  ($) 
  amount below allowed ADFOR operations budget in year  ($) 
  amount over allowed procurement budget in year  ($) 
  amount below allowed procurement budget in year  ($) 
  amount over allowed total operations budget in year  ($) 
  amount below allowed total operations budget in year  ($) 
  amount over allowed total budget in year  ($) 
  amount below allowed total budget in year  ($) 
  amount over allowed CAS budget in year  ($) 
  amount below allowed CAS budget in year  ($) 
 Training Platform Prescription Variables 
 number of sorties of aircraft  at location configured with pod  that 
  satisfies requirement  in year  (# sorties) 
 number of sorties of CAS types aircraft  from location to fly for   
  requirement  in year  (# sorties) 
 number of sorties of fleet aircraft type  to fly for requirement  in year  
  (# sorties) 
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 number of sorties of aircraft  at location to fly on training range  that 
  satisfies requirement  in year  (# sorties)  
 number of aircraft  at location to upgrade to  in year  that were 
  procured in year  (# upgrade)  
 number of aircraft  at location to transfer to location  in year  that 
  were procured in year  (# transfers)  
 number of aircraft  at location  to procure in year  (# aircraft) 
 number of pod  to procure in year  at location  (# pod) 
 number of training range to procure in year  (# training range) 
 number of aircraft  at location to retire in year  that were procured in 
  year  (# aircraft)  
 Control Decision Variables 
 inventory of available aircraft  at location  in year procured in year 
   (# aircraft)  
 total pool of flight hours expended on aircraft of type , year  (# hour) 
 number of pods  available at location , year  (# pod) 
 inventory of training range , year  (# training range)  
 binary variable with value one if maintaining aircraft group  at location 
   in year  
 binary variable with value one if procure aircraft  from year  to year 
    
 binary variable with value one if procure pod  from year  to year   
 binary variable with value one if upgrade aircraft  to  from  






Objective function (Minimize penalty for not meeting capability requirements and total 
adversary operations and maintenance costs) 
subject to: 
 Airframe Inventory 
        (1) 
        (2) 
      (2) 
        (3) 
        (4) 
 Airframe Flight Hours 
       (5) 
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  (6) 
        (7) 
 Airframe Pods, Upgrades and Transfers 
         (8) 
       (9) 
       (10) 
      (11) 
        (12) 
        (13) 
 Airframe Sortie 
     (14) 
     (15) 
     (16) 
 Other Platforms 
         (17) 
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      (18) 
       (19) 
       (20) 
       (21) 
        (22) 
        (23) 
 Requirements 
 
  (24) 
     (25) 
 Procurement and Retirement 
        (26) 
       (27) 
       (28) 
     (29) 
     (30) 
         (31) 
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     (32) 
     (33) 
   (34) 
   (35) 
        (36) 
     (37) 
     (38) 
   (39) 
   (40) 
        (41) 
 Budget 
    (42) 
    (43) 
      (44) 
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      (45) 
    (46) 
      (47) 
      (48) 
  
  (49) 
    (50) 
  
  (51) 
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   (52) 
 Non-negativity Bounds 
        (53) 
     (54)  
 Integer Variables 
         (55) 
          (56) 
           (57) 
          (58) 
           (59) 
          (60) 
 Binary Variables 
          (61) 
          (62) 
          (63) 
          (64) 
D. EQUATION EXPLANATION 
Constraints (1) set the initial aircraft inventory; (2) track aircraft inventory yearly; 
(3) track aircraft inventory yearly; (4) constrain the aircraft inventory to a maximum; (5) 
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constrain the aircraft inventory to a minimum; (6) set the initial flight hours; (7) track 
flight hours yearly; (8) constrain the flight hours by the aircraft life; (9) set the initial 
aircraft pod inventory; (10) track aircraft pod inventory yearly; (11) constrain the number 
of transfers by the available inventory; (12) constrain aircraft upgrades by the current 
inventory; (13) set the initial procurement amount; (14) constrain the number of aircraft 
transfers by the number procured; (15) constrain the maximum number of flight hours 
flown on each aircraft; (16) constrain the minimum number of flight hours flown on each 
aircraft; (17) constrain the number of sorties flown with pods by the available pods; (18) 
set the initial advanced training range inventory; (19) track advanced training range 
inventory yearly; (20) constrain the number of sorties flown on the advanced training 
ranges; (21) constrain the maximum flight hours flown by CAS; (22) constrain the 
minimum flight hours flown by CAS; (23) constrain the maximum number of sorties 
flown by fleet aircraft for each requirement yearly; (24) constrain the maximum total 
number of sorties flown by fleet aircraft yearly; (25) constrain the maximum total number 
of sorties from all platforms by each requirement; (26) measures any capability shortfall; 
(27) constrain aircraft retirement; (28) through (42) constrain the procurement of aircraft, 
aircraft pods and aircraft upgrades; (43) through (53) apply budget constraints; (54) and 
(55) define positive variables; (56) through (61) define integer variables; (62) through 
(65) define binary variables.  
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS 
A. IMPLEMENTATION 
ADSOT uses the Generalized Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) to generate 
its integer linear program and CPLEX to solve it (GAMS, 2013).  GAMS is a commercial 
modeling system specifically designed for modeling linear, nonlinear and integer linear 
optimization problems.  ADSOT uses the CPLEX solver version 12.4.0.0 within GAMS.  
The model solves in less than one hour for most excursions when run on a PC (personal 
computer) with dual Intel(K) Xeon(R) 2.13Ghz CPU (central processing unit) and 48 GB 
of RAM when accepting the first solution guaranteed to be within one percent of optimal.  
B. BASE CASE 
All ADSOT analysis uses input gathered from multiple fleet sources and is the 
result of extensive coordination with several subject matter experts.  Analysis of the 
ADSOT base case verifies that the model effectively approximates the current use of 
OPFOR sorties to meet training requirements.  This includes assumptions regarding 
available ADFOR platforms and parameters such as the planned flight hour execution 
each year and expected overhead percentages.  ADFOR airframes are also restricted to 
their current home base locations; therefore they cannot permanently relocate in order to 
realize any efficiency due to co-location of training aircraft with requirements.  
Procurement is limited to replacement of existing ADFOR F/A-18 aircraft with 
recapitalized F/A-18 aircraft on a one-for-one basis.  Analysis of the base case provides 
an opportunity for rudimentary verification of the model.  It also provides a comparison 
point for other excursions that allow performance improving courses of action, such as 
procuring new aircraft, changing the home port location of aircraft, or upgrading aircraft. 
1. Base Case Assumptions 
a. Training Platforms 
 Table 7 provides the initial aircraft and pods available for ADFOR.  Note that we 
aggregate different variants of the F-5, F-16 and F/A-18 A-D together as a single aircraft 
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type.  The total number of aircraft available, 83, is significantly less than the value  of 97 
provided by TSW (see Table 1).  This is due to the current decreased availability of many 
of the NSAWC aircraft (LCDR B. Blair, NSAWC F-16 Program Manager, personal 
communication, June–August, 2013). 
 
 
Table 7.   ADFOR aircraft and pods available for the base case.  No upgrades or 
additional pods are considered.  
Table 8 provides the initial parameters for the ADFOR aircraft.  The “minimum 
hours to fly per year” is 10 percent less than the maximum hours in order to provide 
ADSOT some limited flexibility for scheduling while adhering to the forecast flight hour 
usage over the next 20-years.  This constraint prevents ADSOT from grounding more 
expensive training platforms until they reach their flight hour limit.  The “overhead 
hours” refers to the percentage of flight hours required for each aircraft that aren’t 
directly related to performing a red air mission.  These hours are typically required for 
training of adversary pilots, maintenance check flights on the aircraft, and transit flights 
where no training is accomplished.  All costs are in terms of FY13 (Table 8).  
Table 9 presents a sample of the capability and platform configuration matchups 




Table 8.   Key parameters for ADFOR aircraft.  Note the high average flight hours 
already expended on the aircraft.   
 
Table 9.   Matrix of training platform configuration (row) and capability (column) 
matchups (a value of one denotes that the platform configuration is capable 
of performing the requirement capability).   
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Figure 10 depicts the matrix of training utilities for each requirement bin.  These 
values are weighted to reflect the author’s judgment regarding the relative importance of 
each capability and requirement pairing.  As an example, reference Table 9 to see that a 
base F-5 (F-5 none) is capable of the following capabilities; WVR(III), BVR, RAD(SR) 
and DIS.  When performing a B2 training requirement, an F-5 achieves a training utility 
of 85 percent (25%+35%+20%+5%).  The same aircraft only achieves a training utility of 
70 percent (25%+25%+15%+5%) for executing a C2 training requirement.  
Figure 10.   Matrix of percentage of training accomplished for each Requirement Bin 
(row) compared to each training platform capability (column).   
ADSOT implements parameters for CAS flight hour costs and contracted flight 
hour usage.  Actual values are not published in this thesis, as the specific details 
regarding CAS contracts are proprietary.  Estimates for the values are provided by CNA 
(Huntzinger et al., 2011) as follows:   
• CAS type 2 approximately $5,000 CPH; 
• CAS type 3 approximately $9,000 CPH; and 
• CAS type 4 approximately $11,500 CPH. 
For the base case, ADSOT uses the limits from Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) request for proposal (NAVAIR, 2011b).  Specifically, up to 4,000 hours 
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annually for high subsonic aircraft (third generation) and 1,400 hours annually for 
supersonic aircraft (fourth generation), including provisions for EA.   
ADSOT assumes two types of fleet aircraft capable of meeting the demand for 
red air training: F/A-18A/C and F/A-18E/F.  ADSOT penalizes fleet aircraft in order to 
incentivize the use of ADFOR and CAS before fleet aircraft.  Table 10 provides CPH 
data for fleet aircraft. 
 
 
Table 10.   CPH for fleet aircraft flying in the red air roll for the base case ADSOT 
runs.  (CDR R. Turner, CNAFR N8 – Requirements, personal 
communication, August 2013)  
b. Sorties and Events 
Table 11 depicts the event factors and the average sortie length by training 
location.  These values are aggregated from two CNA studies (Huntzinger et al., 2011; 
Price & Doll, 2012) and inputs from SMEs. 
 
 
Table 11.   Event factor and average sortie length based on the location where the 




Table 12 provides the number of adversary events required for each training phase 
and location pair.  For the base case ADSOT uses adversary event requirement data as 
compiled by CNA (Huntzinger et al., 2011), including counts of total number of events. 
for each training phase and requirement bin.   
 
Table 12.   Number of annual adversary events required for each training phase and 
location, sorted into different requirement bins.  Shaded rows denote the 
core training phase events (After Huntzinger et al., 2011) 
d. Training Platform Capabilities 
Table 13 provides the aggregated training utility provided by each adversary 
training platform configuration used in the base case.   
e. Procurement, Upgrades and Transfers 
The ADSOT base case model limits ADFOR procurement options to the 
replacement of aging NSAWC and RC F/A-18s with newer, recapitalized F/A-18E and 
F/A-18C aircraft previously used by the fleet.  The procurement of these assets is strictly 
regulated to mirror their expected procurement based on the timeline provided in Figure 
4.  Specifically, this planned procurement amounts to $360M for recapitalization of 36 
F/A-18 aircraft in ADSOT.  For clarity purposes, this amount is referred to as “planned 
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procurement.”  Aircraft upgrades and the procurement of new pods are not allowed in the 
base case model.  Aircraft transfers are also not allowed in the base case model. 
f. Penalties 
For the base case penalties are adjusted so that the completion of core phase 
training events are at a higher priority than non-core phase training events.  A penalty is 
also added for using fleet aircraft prior to exhausting sortie capacity of ADFOR and CAS.  
All penalties are discounted for years later in the planning horizon. 
 
Table 13.   OPFOR training utilities for the training platforms available in the base 
case.  A complete list is available in Appendix A. 
2. Base Case Results 
As prescribed by ADSOT, Figures 11 and 12 show the percentage of training met 
by each OPFOR platform in the base case for FY15 and FY33 (two of the 20 years 
available).   
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Figure 11.   Depiction of predicted sources of adversary support ADSOT prescribes for 
the base case in FY15.  The percentage of training met by each different 
OPFOR is shown.  Note that the ADFOR aircraft are broken down into three 
separate categories, F-5F/N, F-16A/B and F/A-18A-F. 
In FY15, ADSOT prescribes ADFOR F-5s and fleet aircraft with the vast 
majority of the training as they have the greatest number of sorties to allocate.  We also 
see a concentration of F/A-18 and F-16 aircraft in the training phases that typically have 
the greatest number of more advanced training requirements (those denoted as D1 or 
above), such as SFTI and CVW Fallon.   
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Figure 12.  Depiction of sources of adversary support ADSOT prescribes for the base 
case in FY33.  The percentage of training met by each different OPFOR is 
shown.   
In FY33 (Figure 12) no training is completed by F-5s or F-16s.  This is because 
we have reached the flight hour limits for both these aircraft and no longer have any in 
the inventory.  This is a likely consequence of a lack of ADFOR procurement. 
Figure 13 depicts the ADFOR aircraft inventory over the 20-year planning 
horizon.  For the base case ADSOT prescribes the retiring of NSAWC and RC F/A-
18A/B and F/A-18A/C aircraft beginning in FY17.  ADSOT replaces these aircraft by 
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recapitalizing fleet F/A-18E/F Super Hornets, including some equipped with the AESA 
radar system.  The schedule of retiring and procuring aircraft is slightly optimistic when 
compared to Figure 4 (Nichols, 2012), however, ADSOT determines this is possible 
under current business practices and proposed future flight hour usage.   
 
Figure 13.   Depiction of ADFOR aircraft inventory ADSOT prescribes by type for the 
base case over the 20-year planning horizon.  There exists no plan to replace 
aging F-5 and F-16 aircraft.  F/A-18 aircraft are replaced eventually with 
AESA equipped F/A-18E/F.  
As prescribed by ADSOT in the base case, Figure 14 shows the training utility by 
requirement bins for three different glimpses into the planning horizon, FY15, FY20, and 
FY25 (three of the 20 years available).  The less rigorous training requirements (towards 
left) are met at 100 percent training utility or close to it.  The more advanced training 
requirements (towards right) are met at significantly less training utility, sometimes close 
to 60 percent.  Figure 14 also shows that in many cases the training utility is actually  
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going up over time.  This is a result of the fact that as aging aircraft, such as the F-5, are 





Figure 14.   Graph of training utility across the different requirement bins for FY15, FY20 
and FY25 as prescribed by ADSOT in the base case.  As older (less capable) 
aircraft are retired the training utility actually goes up over time as more 
advanced fleet aircraft and new ADFOR F/A-18E/F fill the gap. 
Figure 15 depicts the annual flight hour usage of the ADFOR aircraft as compared 
to the fleet as prescribed by ADSOT in the base case.  The fleet flight hour usage climbs 
as the size of the ADFOR shrinks and more adversary training is accomplished using 
organic red air.   
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Figure 15.   Projected hours flown by fleet and ADFOR assets performing the red air 
mission as prescribed by ADSOT for the base case. 
Figure 16 shows the total operating cost for the ADSOT prescriptions over the 20-
year planning horizon.  Initially the cost is fairly level at $380M and begins a shallow 
decrease until FY24 as aging, more expensive, F/A-18 aircraft are retired. When the F-5 
aircraft retire in FY24 the cost increases to just short of $400M as more expensive fleet 





Figure 16.   Total operating cost for ADSOT prescriptions over the 20-year planning 
horizon.   
C. PROCUREMENT INJECT EXCURSIONS 
For the procurement inject excursions we expand on the base case by adding the 
possibility of three different procurement inject amounts; $100M, $200M and $300M.  
These amounts are in addition to the base case planned procurement dollars of $360M for 
recapitalization of fleet assets.  We limit procurement options to new ADFOR aircraft, 
ADFOR upgrades and ADFOR pods.  The planned procurement of re-capitalized F/A-18 
aircraft to replace aging aircraft on a one-for-one basis is relaxed so those monies can be 
applied to other airframes, pods or upgrades. These planned procurement amounts are not 
reflected as part of the additional procurement inject, therefore, the $100M inject 
excursion has $100M+$360M=$460M available for procurement.  Constraints regarding 
the fixed home base locations of ADFOR aircraft are also relaxed.  Most of the 
parameters used in the base case remain the same, however, in specific instances detailed 
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below, we change the parameters to account for the procurement inject.  The 
apportionment of the procurement inject is an ADSOT optimization result. 
1. Procurement Inject Excursion Assumptions 
a. Procurement, Upgrades and Transfers 
Table 14 provides the list of aircraft procurement options and applicable data.  
Costs for the F-16 is for a brand new aircraft, while both F-5 and F/A-18 aircraft are 
based on the ability to recapitalize “used” aircraft.  In the case of the F-5s, these could 
possibly be acquired from the Swiss as was the previous batch (NAVAIR, 2009).  It is 
assumed that the F/A-18s are prior fleet assets that can be transferred to the ADFOR.  
There is currently a plan in place to do this beginning in year FY17 (Nichols, 2012).  This 
explains the “average hours expended” in Table 14.  These are the hours on the aircraft 
already flown when received by the ADFOR.  
ADSOT replicates standard multi-year procurement contracts, including 
maximum and minimum procurement limits, in terms of number of aircraft, on both an 
annual basis and throughout the total life of the contract.  For all excursions in this thesis, 
if a procurement contract is executed, the minimum procurement is set at one and the 
maximum at 50 for both the annual and total limits.  
In this implementation ADSOT allows transfer of ADFOR aircraft to new or 
alternate locations in order to realize efficiencies of locating the ADFOR closer to the 
training location.    
 
 
Table 14.   Aircraft procurement options available for the procurement inject excursion 
and appropriate parameters.  Limited and conflicting data is available 
regarding procurement costs.  These values are estimates (After SMEs).   
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Table 15 shows the different Pod and aircraft upgrade procurement options with 
appropriate costs.  The procurement cost data is adapted from the CNA study in 2012 
(Price & Doll, 2012).  Note that the “# of pod required per aircraft” refers the ability to 
move pods from one aircraft to another in order to improve effectiveness.  A lower 
number indicates a pod that can be moved.  
 
 
Table 15.   Pod and aircraft upgrade procurement options available and appropriate 
parameters. (After Price & Doll, 2012) 
2. Procurement Inject Excursion Results 
Figure 17 shows the total procurement prescribed by ADSOT over the planning 
horizon for the three different inject amounts in the procurement inject excursion.  With 
the base case procurement constraints relaxed regarding the recapitalized F/A-18 aircraft, 
ADSOT prescribes less procurement of those aircraft in favor of the less expensive F-5 
Tiger II until reaching the $300 million mark.  This is because of the relative low CPH of 
the F-5.  At all three procurement levels, pod prescriptions are the same.  The only 
prescribed upgrades are for the HMS systems, which occur at the $300 million level.  
With the exception of the base case, the ADSOT prescribed procurements are nested in 
that each prescribed procurement is a subset of procurements prescribed for greater inject 
amounts.  Each procurement inject also shares the fact ADSOT elects to transfer F/A-18 
aircraft from New Orleans LA, to Lemoore CA, Oceana VA and Key West FL.  This is in 
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addition to adding F-5 aircraft at both locations and moving some F-16 aircraft to Key 
West from Fallon. 
 
Figure 17.   Procurement and upgrades prescribed by ADSOT for four different 
procurement inject amounts in the procurement inject excursion.   
These ADSOT procurements prescribed vary significantly from those found by 
CNA in their study (Price & Doll, 2012).  CNA found that R3 (radar systems) upgrades 
on the aircraft make the biggest impact on improving performance of the ADFOR fleet, 
followed by HMS and EA upgrades.  These differences are due primarily to the fact that 
CNA didn’t consider procurement of new or recapitalized aircraft in their study.  CNA 
also quantified the training utility differently than ADSOT.  More weight is given in the 
CNA study to R3 capability as a single factor.  ADSOT is more granular and uses five 
capabilities that together equate to R3, which gives more “partial” credit to some 
airframes. 
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Figure 18 is the resulting training utility values by requirement bin for the $300M 
procurement level prescribed by ADSOT.  As expected, by procuring additional aircraft, 
pods and upgrades, the training utility goes up.  In the case of the E3 bin, we have risen 
from a value of approximately 65 percent in the base case (see Figure 14) to a value 
approaching 90 percent.  That is close to a 40 percent increase in the training utility for 
that requirement bin.  We see similar increases in most other bins with the exception of 
D2, which has dropped slightly.  This is because the D2 requirements occur during 
SFWT and ULT training which are a slightly lower priority than the core events.   
 
Figure 18.  Aggregated training utility by requirement bin as prescribed by ADSOT with 
a $300 million procurement inject allowed. 
Figure 19 is the annual projected aggregated training utility by year as prescribed 
by ADSOT in the procurement inject excursion.  In the case of all procurement injects we 
see a rise in the projected training utility. 
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Figure 19.  Annual aggregated training utility prescribed by ADSOT in the procurement 
inject excursion.  All procurement injects raise the training utility 
significantly over the first 11 years of the planning horizon. 
Figure 20 shows the fleet flight hours flown as red air over the 20-year planning 
horizon for the base case and each inject amount.  With the ability to procure more 
ADFOR aircraft there is a substantial reduction in fleet hours.  Consider the $100 million 
inject level.  ADSOT prescribes the procurement of 47 F-5 aircraft, 25 F/A-18 aircraft 
(recapitalized from the fleet) and 20 performance enhancing pods.  Compared to the base 
case, which only allows for the recapitalization of 36 F/A-18 aircraft, the $100M inject 
excursion prescribes an additional 36 ADFOR aircraft.  The higher sortie capacity of the 
ADFOR, coupled with better F-5 performance using pods, results in fewer hours flown 




Figure 20.  Fleet hours expended performing the red air mission as prescribed by ADSOT 
in the procurement inject excursions.  Even at the procurement level of $100 
million there is substantial flight hour savings. 
Figure 21 shows the total operating cost for all adversary training.  This is the sum 
of the operating cost of the ADFOR, CAS and fleet aircraft flying in the adversary role.  
In the first few yeas the cost is lower than the base case, even before the procurement.  
This is because ADSOT optimizes over the entire planning period, placing a premium on 
training utility when compared to operating cost.  With more ADFOR assets available in 
the future it can be more efficient with the sortie assignments in the early years while 
maximizing the training utility values.  Specifically, F-5 hours can be applied more 
liberally and operated at a lower cost.  Eventually, the cost rises to above that of the base 
case in all procurement scenarios because of the increased flying of the expensive high 
flight time aircraft in an effort to maximize the training utility.  As with the base case, 
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when the more expensive, aging F/A-18 aircraft reach their flight hour limit and are 
retired we see the operating cost drop. 
 
Figure 21.  Total operating cost for adversary training.  Includes the cost of ADFOR, 
CAS and fleet aircraft flying in the adversary role. 
ADSOT shows that procurement injects and transfers of ADFOR aircraft to 
different locations improve training utility values, while lowering operating costs and the 
flight hour usage of the fleet.  For the $300M procurement inject, the training utility 
value rose by as much as seven percent for some years.  The total cost to provide training 
over the entire planning horizon dropped by $490M, resulting in a net savings of $490M-
$300M=$190M.  Finally, over 250,000 flight hours are saved on fleet aircraft. 
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D. RELAXED CONSTRAINT EXCURSION 
The ADSOT base case constrains ADFOR annual minimum flight hour usage to 
10 percent below the budgeted usage by OPNAV.  As a result, we see in Figure 21 that 
the operating cost of the ADFOR initially increases when procurement options are 
pursued as older, more expensive aircraft are utilized.  This is despite the fact that those 
aircraft may not be the most efficient or cost effective training platform to meet the 
training requirement.  The base case also constrains the location of ADFOR aircraft to 
their current bases.  In the relaxed constraint excursion, these flight hour usage and 
aircraft location constraints are relaxed along with conditions regarding the planned 
procurement. 
1. Relaxed Constraint Excursion Assumptions 
a. Training Platforms  
Table 16 provides the updated ADFOR parameters to use in this excursion.  The 
“minimum hours to fly per year” and “maximum hours to fly per year” data has been 
altered from the base case to reflect a hypothetical lower and upper bound of 20 percent 
and 120 percent of the budgeted flight hour amounts used in the base case. 
 
 
Table 16.   Key parameters for ADFOR aircraft.  Red shading reflects changed 
parameters for the ADSOT relaxed constraint excursion. 
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b. Procurement, Upgrades and Transfers 
The ADSOT relaxed constraint excursion allows no additional procurement inject 
but does allow for relaxed allocation of the planned procurement monies ($360 million).  
Constraints regarding airframe transfers between available home base locations have also 
been lifted. 
2. Relaxed Constraint Excursion Results 
Figure 22 shows the location of the three types of ADFOR aircraft prescribed 
over the planning horizon.   
 
Figure 22.  ADFOR Inventory by location over the 20-year planning horizon for the 
relaxed constraint excursion as prescribed by ADSOT.  
ADSOT elects to move the location of ADFOR aircraft closer to the demand 
locations.  Aircraft move out of New Orleans, as there are no demand sources at that 
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location.  F-5s shift to Lemoore and some F-16 aircraft to Key West to reflect a better 
matching of ADFOR capabilities with location driven requirements.  
Figure 23 shows the allocation of the planned procurement dollars as prescribed 
by ADSOT for the relaxed constraint excursion.  Recall that in the base case the planned 
procurement is fixed at $360 million to procure 36 F/A-18 aircraft to replace aging 
aircraft on a one-for-one basis.  In the relaxed constraint excursion those monies are 
applied to seek more efficiencies in adversary training.   
 
Figure 23.  Procurement and upgrades prescribed by ADSOT for the relaxed case 
excursion using planned procurement dollars of $360M.   
Figure 24 shows the aggregated training utility achieved as prescribed by ADSOT 
in the relaxed constraint excursion compared to the base case.   
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Figure 24.  Annual aggregated training utility prescribed by ADSOT for the relaxed 
constraint excursion compared to the base case.   
More efficient use of the ADFOR results in generally higher training utilities over 
the planning horizon with some exceptions during FY24 through FY27.  In some cases 
the improvement is as high as six percent. 
Figure 25 shows the prescribed fleet flight hour usage of the relaxed constraint 
excursion compared to the base case.   
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Figure 25.  Fleet hours expended performing the red air mission as prescribed by ADSOT 
in the relaxed constraint excursion.  Total savings of 105,000 hours are 
realized over the entire planning horizon. 
In the relaxed constraint excursion ADSOT can co-locate aircraft with 
requirements and more efficiently meet the demand.  Also, with the minimum flight 
hours relaxed, F-5 aircraft can be used more efficiently throughout the planning horizon.  
The result is a savings of 105,000 hours on fleet airframes over the planning horizon. 
Figure 26 shows the annual total operating cost of the relaxed constraint case 
compared to the base case.  In the relaxed constraint excursion ADSOT is able to manage 
the flight hours more efficiently throughout the planning horizon.  This coupled with the 
acquisition of additional F-5 aircraft lead to lower operating costs throughout the 
planning horizon.  Relaxing the constraints allows for a total savings of $720 million. 
 70 
 
Figure 26.   Total operating cost of adversary training for the relaxed constraint excursion 
compared to the base case.   
E. ADVANCED REQUIREMENT EXCURSION 
Currently there is much debate amongst the stakeholders as to what is the actual 
requirement for adversary training (LCDR B. Harjer, OPNAV Adversary Requirements 
Officer, personal communication, March, 2013).  Training requirements are based, at 
least in part, on the capability of OPFOR to meet them.  Multiple training demand 
sources further complicate the issue.  In the advanced requirement excursion the total 
number of required events remains the same, however, events are shifted from less 
complex requirement bins to more complex bins.  This reflects a hypothetical shift to 
training with increased capability requirements of the adversary aircraft.  All other 
parameters remain the same as in base case and when appropriate, the procurement 
injects excursion. 
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1. Advanced Requirement Excursion Assumptions 
a. Requirements 
Table 17 provides the updated requirement counts.  The total core and non-core 
events have not changed.  The basic requirement bins have been removed and their 
values have been added to the more complicated requirement bins.  
 
 
Table 17.   Updated requirements to reflect a shift to more advanced training 
requirements.   
2. Advanced Requirement Excursion Results 
Figure 27 shows annual aggregated training utility values achieved by ADSOT 
prescriptions for the advanced requirement excursion.  With the increased complexity of 
the requirement we see that training utility generated in the base case is much lower.  The 
“limited procurement” mirrors the base case in terms of constraining procurement only to 
the planned replacement of aging F/A-18s.  For the base case, we see that training utility 
values range between 65 and 71 percent.  Even with procurement up to $300 million the 
highest training utility we can attain is only 79 percent.  ADSOT provides an analytical 
tool to help better define these relationships. 
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Figure 27.  Annual aggregated training utility prescribed by ADSOT for the advanced 
requirements excursion procurement injects compared to the base case.   
 
F. LVC TRAINING RANGE EXCURSION 
ADSOT models the LVC concept as a hypothetical range, which improves the 
capabilities of ADFOR aircraft by augmenting aspects of their performance through 
constructive and simulated inputs to the Blue force aircraft weapons systems. For 
example, an F-5 can look like a SU-30 on the radar on the proposed LVC range.  LVC 
ranges can also increase the sortie capacity of ADFOR by requiring less aircraft to meet 
requirements.  For example, a training event that requires four adversary aircraft may 
only require two aircraft if flown on an LVC range.  
 In the LVC excursion, ADSOT allows the procurement of an LVC range at a 
procurement cost of $180 million dollars.  Planned procurement of re-capitalized F/A-18 
aircraft to replace aging aircraft on a one-for-one basis is relaxed so those monies can be 
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applied to other airframes, pods or upgrades.  Only ADFOR aircraft can take advantage 
of the LVC range’s enhancement of capabilities. 
1. LVC Training Range Excursion Assumptions 
a. Sorties and Events 
Table 18 provides the event multiplier for performing training on an LVC range.  
The multiplier only applies for events that require multiple red air, therefore it is only a 
factor for requirements in bins C2 and up.  For example, for a C2 binned event, the 
ADSOT LVC excursion only prescribes two adversary aircraft to meet a four event 
requirement.   
 
 
Table 18.   Multiplier for performing training on an LVC range.     
b. Training Platform Capabilities 
Table 19 provides training utility for each ADFOR aircraft when flown on the 
LVC range.  Note that the range improves the performance of all aircraft and in most 
cases it maximizes its value at one.  In the case of the F-5, performance is still degraded 
because of the failure of the F-5 to provide a “WVR IV” training capability. 
Table 19.   Updated training utility values reflecting the ability of an LVC range to 
augment the performance capability of aircraft.   
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2. LVC Training Range Excursion Results 
Figure 28 shows annual aggregated training utility values for an LVC range when 
compared to the base case.  We see that once the LVC range is procured by the second 
year the training utility immediately increases to above 90 percent for the remainder of 
the planning horizon. 
Annual aggregated training utility values achieved by ADSOT prescription for an 
LVC range when compared to the base case.   
Figure 29 shows the annual fleet flight hour expenditure performing the red air 
mission as prescribed by ADSOT for the LVC excursion.  Over the 20-year planning 





Figure 28.  Fleet hours expended performing the red air mission as prescribed by ADSOT 
for LVC range excursion compared to base case.  
Figure 30 shows the total operating cost to provide adversary training for the LVC 
range and the base case for comparison purposes.  Over the 20-year planning horizon 




Figure 29.   Total operating cost for adversary training using a LVC range compared to 
the base case.  Includes the cost of ADFOR, CAS and fleet aircraft flying in 





Adversary training is a critical requirement for the Navy’s fleet of strike-fighter 
aircraft and aircrew.  Currently, a significant gap exists between the ADFOR and the 
demand for training in terms of both sortie capacity, and aircraft capability.  Simply put, 
there aren’t enough aircraft and the existing ones are technologically lagging compared to 
the threat aircraft that they are simulating in training.  CAS and fleet aircraft are flown to 
supplement adversary training and help to fill the gap.  The gap is forecast to grow as 
early as 2013 when aging ADFOR aircraft begin to reach their flight hour limits.  The 
Navy has no plan in place for replacing or updating its fleet of ADFOR aircraft. 
ADSOT uses an integer-linear program to optimize the assignment of red air 
sorties, for various OPFOR platforms, to meet the annual fleet training demands over a 
20-year planning horizon.  ADSOT minimizes the operating cost and capability shortfall 
to provide an optimal yearly training plan over a 20-year planning horizon.  A training 
utility value captures the capability shortfall for a requirement as the percentage of the 
training objective met by prescribed OPFOR aircraft.  ADSOT imposes constraints that 
annually constrain and/or manage budgets, flight hours, aircraft inventory, CAS contract 
limits, and aircraft home base locations.  Output includes OPFOR yearly aircraft sortie 
assignment, projected yearly costs, projected yearly flight hour expenditure, and 
aggregated yearly training utility delivered. 
All ADSOT analysis uses input gathered from multiple fleet sources and is the 
result of extensive coordination with several subject matter experts.  Analysis of the 
ADSOT base case verifies that the model effectively approximates the current use of 
OPFOR sorties to meet training requirements.  ADSOT excursions allow for various 
levels of procurement dollar injects.  These show that procurement in the near term will 
result in improved training utility values, while lowering both operating costs and the 
number of red air sorties flown by fleet aircraft.  For a $300 million procurement inject, 
ADSOT sortie prescription increases overall training utility by as much as seven percent, 
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decreased operating costs by $490 million over 20 years, and predicted a savings of over 
250,000 flight hours on fleet aircraft.   
One ADSOT excursion considered the relaxation of ADFOR flight hour, location, 
and planned procurement.  ADSOT found that significant savings in both flight hours and 
operating cost are achieved.  Over the 20-year planning horizon the fleet flight hour 
savings is over 100,000 hours and the operating cost savings is $720 million.  This was 
achieved while improving training utility by up to six percent during some early years, 
and only minimally degrading training utility over some later years. 
Additional ADSOT excursions consider more advanced training requirements and 
investments into LVC training ranges.  In the case of more advanced training 
requirements, the current OPFOR platforms have difficulty achieving an overall training 
utility value greater than 70 percent.  Even with an investment of $300 million the highest 
training utility achieved over any given year throughout the 20-year planning horizon is 
79 percent.  A hypothetical LVC range is modeled with limited fidelity to improve 
performance of ADFOR aircraft when using the range.  Results indicated that 
improvements in training utility by over 10 percent annually over the base case are 
possible.  This is accomplished by decreasing the total operating cost by $1.7 billion 
dollars, and total fleet flight hour expenditure by 194,000 hours over the 20-year planning 
horizon. 
B. FUTURE RESEARCH 
ADSOT provides a methodology that can easily be manipulated to allow for many 
other considerations for optimization of performing the red air mission. 
1. Add Stochastic Requirements 
This thesis performs one requirement excursion.  Much more work in this area is 
necessary.  The task of quantifying the requirement is difficult as it depends on many 
competing factors such as the training phase, training type and the training customer.  
This is complicated by the fact that many of the requirements are overlapping and 
dependent on randomness inherent in the system. Deployment schedules, aircrew 
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manning, efficiency in scheduling and future platform capabilities are just a few 
examples of this. ADSOT can be altered to provide more flexibility and perhaps some 
stochastic properties in terms of the requirements.  The model could then be incorporated 
into a design of experiments to determine which factors most significantly affect the 
results. 
2. Consider Revisions to Capabilities 
The capabilities used to match the training platforms to requirements are a key 
component to ADSOT.  These capabilities are the result of extensive research by the 
author and input from multiple fleet SMEs.  More work can be done to refine these 
capabilities and determine the impact of subtle changes to the results.  There is another 
opportunity here for a design of experiments to determine what levels of training utility 
value represent significant differences in ADSOT results. 
3. Adjust Costs to Account for Lost Opportunity Cost 
As touched upon in this thesis, the use of fleet aircraft to fly in the adversary role 
uses up flight hours on aircraft that could be used for other purposes, such as blue force 
training, or more importantly, executing real world missions.  This lost opportunity cost 
of the aircraft needs to be analyzed.  The actual cost savings of expanding the ADFOR 
might be significantly greater than indicated when this is taken into account. 
4. Incorporate Other Benefits of the ADFOR 
The operating and maintaining of a dedicated adversary force has other benefits 
that aren’t incorporated into this study.  For one, having an ADFOR ensures a cadre of 
experienced military aircrew who are at the ready in the event of a national emergency.  
It is hard to quantify this benefit, but as with the National Guard and the Air Force, there 
is certainly some utility to having a fleet of reserve fighters and aircrew standing at the 
ready.   
There are also other opportunities for using very cost effective third generation 
aircraft such as the F-5.  They could be used as a lead or wingman for multi-ship 
formations in training where the instructor doesn’t need to fly the more expensive fleet 
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aircraft.  This savings could be significant when considering aircraft such as the JSF 
which is projected to cost close to $30 thousand (Butler, 2013) per flight hour.    
5. Incorporate More Simulator Training 
The fidelity of simulators continues to increase as they become more and more 
able to approximate actual flight.  The potential value of these training simulators can be 





APPENDIX. PLATFORM CONFIGURATIONS 
Table 20 provides a matrix of ADFOR platform configuration (rows) and 
capability (columns) matchups.  A value of one denotes that the platform configuration is 
capable of performing the column’s capability. 
 
 
Table 20.   Matrix of ADFOR platform configuration (row) and capability (column) 
matchups.  Note that the pods EA5 and SLP5 denote the EA pod and 
Sleeper pod for the F-5.  The pods EA18, SLP18 and IR18 denote the EA, 




Table 20 (continued). 
Table 21 provides the matrix of training utility values for each training platform 




Table 21.   Adversary training platform training utilities for each platform 




Table 21 (continued). 
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